Can a Lawyer Use a “Per Diem” Argument for Pain and Suffering in Georgia?

Only in closing argument, and only on the terms O.C.G.A. § 9-10-184 has set since the 2025 reform. A per diem argument proposes a dollar value for each day of pain and multiplies it by the days the injury has lasted or will last. The statute does not name the technique, but any argument about “the worth or monetary value of noneconomic damages” must come “only after the close of evidence and at the time of such party’s first opportunity to argue the issue of damages”, must be “rationally related to the evidence of noneconomic damages”, and may not refer to “objects or values having no rational connection to the facts proved by the evidence” (§ 9-10-184(c)(1)).

Testing a per diem argument against the statute

Question	What § 9-10-184 says	Effect on a per diem argument
When can the daily figure be mentioned?	Argument on value is allowed only after the close of evidence, at the party's first opportunity to argue damages ((c)(1))	Not in voir dire, opening statement, or during the evidence
Can a witness supply the daily figure?	No one may, in the jury's hearing, "elicit any testimony regarding, or make any reference to, any specific amount or range of amounts of noneconomic damages" ((b))	No expert or lay witness may put a daily rate or total before the jury
What can the daily figure be based on?	The argument must be rationally related to the evidence and may not reference unconnected objects or values ((c)(1))	The number of days and the daily figure need a footing in the evidence of this person's pain, such as its duration and severity
Can the figure change in rebuttal?	A lawyer with opening and concluding arguments may argue value in conclusion only after arguing one in the opening portion, and not a different value ((c)(2))	The per diem total argued first is the one that stays
What if the line is crossed?	The court "shall take remedial measures" under § 9-10-185, or excuse prospective jurors ((d))	Objections and curative steps follow

The table’s third column applies the statute’s words to a per diem argument. Barker v. Grier, below, raised whether a daily rate is “rationally related to the evidence” under the 2025 text, but did not decide it.

Barker v. Grier: a $500-a-day rebuttal argument

In Barker v. Grier (Ga. Ct. App. June 22, 2026), Owauniss Grier was hurt in a December 2021 collision; she had a bulging disc that would always cause her pain, a permanently crooked thumb, and 19 injections. At the September 2024 trial, her lawyer asked the jury in rebuttal closing to “give Ms. Grier 500 dollars for every single day that the defense has denied taking responsibility”, and the jury awarded $450,000. On appeal, the defendant argued that the figure was not “rationally related to the evidence” and that raising a per diem figure for the first time in rebuttal violated § 9-10-184(c)(2).

The court did not reach either argument. It held that, although the amendments apply to pending cases, the relevant activity the statute regulates is the trial, or its closing arguments, and this trial had ended more than seven months before April 21, 2025, so “the 2025 amendments do not apply with respect to the trial”. The court left open whether the regulated activity is the entire trial or just closing arguments. Under the 2025 text, an argument like the one in Barker would face both the rational-relationship test and the opening-and-rebuttal consistency rule.

What did not survive

Before 2025, § 9-10-184 provided, in its entirety, as Barker quotes it: “In the trial of a civil action for personal injuries, counsel shall be allowed to argue the worth or monetary value of pain and suffering to the jury; provided, however, that any such argument shall conform to the evidence or reasonable deductions from the evidence in the case”. The 2025 text keeps argument but adds the timing rule, the rational-relationship rule, the ban on unconnected reference values, the consistency rule for opening and concluding arguments, and the testimony ban.

When the rule applies

Section 1 of Senate Bill 68, which rewrote § 9-10-184, falls within the bill’s statement of intent that its provisions other than Sections 6 and 7 apply “to causes of action pending on the effective date of this Act, unless such application would be unconstitutional” (§ 9(b)). The effective date was the Governor’s approval on April 21, 2025. Under Barker, “pending” does not reach back to a trial completed before that date.

How juries value pain and suffering in the first place, and the other 2025 changes to § 9-10-184, are explained in how pain and suffering is valued in Georgia.

Sources

General information about Georgia law as of October 2026. It is not legal advice, and reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship.